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Grid Security – Cyber Security
October 2019 – Montana Lab Days
Structured Threat for Automated Response
Machine Learning for Firmware Analysis 
Rita Foster – Infrastructure Security Strategic Advisor
What’s in the embedded system and how can it be protected?
Structured Threat for Automated Response
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Visualized Threat for Sharing, Actionable and Implementable Indicators and Mitigations
– STIG - Structured Threat Intelligence Graph – Visualized Structured Threat Information 
eXpression (STIX)
– EMV - Exploit, Malware and Vulnerability Scoring – Prioritize Flood of Cyber Issues
– STOTS - Structured Threat Observable Tool Set – ‘Just In-Time’ Detection
Structured Threat Intelligence Graph
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Industroyer CrashOverride
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Oilrig – Indicators, Campaigns, Att&ck Patterns and Intrusion 
Sets
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OilRig with Malware Analyzed with Att&ck Patterns
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Interns Analysis with STIG
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Exploit, Malware and Vulnerability Scoring
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Exploits, Malware and Vulnerability Scoring
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EMV Scoring Application 
INL github October 2019
• Applicability to asset owner’s 
implementation
• Consequence to Control and Company
• Utility's Ability to Defend 
• Record Scores, 
• Site References and Changes as the 
Threat Evolves
• Produces STIX objects 
Structured Threat Observable Tool Set
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o Agnostic Detection to create Cyber Observables 
o Just-in-Time detection
o Creates Cyber Observables in STIX for Automated Response
o Framework of command line interfaces for
✓ PacketEngine – Deep Packet Inspection
✓ NetworkEngine – Nodes added/removed
✓ ConfigEngine – Configuration Settings
✓ SyslogEngine – IT/OT Integration
✓ ProcessEngine – What’s Running?
✓ FileEngine – File Changes
✓ CommandLineEngine – Command History
Structured Threat for Automated Response
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Machine Learning for Firmware 
Analysis – Firmware Indicator 
Translation (FIT)
Department of Energy-Cybersecurity Energy Systems & 
Emergency Response – Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery 
Systems (CESER-CEDS) – Laboratory call funded
Goal: Provide tools to defend embedded system firmware 
since our adversaries have raced to the bottom 
Objectives:
• Create a repeatable process to analysis firmware
• Create indicators focused on firmware from wide IT data 
analytics
• Lessons on when binary tools vs translated code 
provides value
• Library of firmware references that can be recreated vs 
reverse engineered
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FIT: Potential Outcomes
Implement graph similarity algorithms – for ubiquitous libraries
Build test corpora from collected referenced binaries
Test effectiveness
Build a Machine Learning System from graph analytics behavior 
of static binaries
Correlate ubiquitous binaries to known vulnerability disclosures
Investigate potential of directly patching static binaries without 
requiring source code
FIT – Taxonomy of 
Firmware Layers
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Alignment of Exploits, Malware 
and Vulnerabilities 
Binary IS Ground Truth
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Identical Code – One Different Compiler Flag 
Visualized Firmware
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200K+ Vertices 
Pulled from One 
Small Device
1
7
Ubiquitous Library Test Scenario – OpenNTP Vulnerability
• Test Corpa
– Open source for sharing and proving concepts 
– Busybox a common light operating system used in embedded systems
• About 2,000 variations - great for training machine learning
– 18 versions of Busybox, 
– X-compiled on 14 architectures
– Using 2 different compilers with 4 optimizations each
• Busybox uses OpenNTPd
– OpenNTPd vulnerability discovered 2009
• CVE-2009-3563
• Vulnerable version (unpatched version used) in Busybox 2009-2016 
– CVE-2016-6301
• Busybox 1.21.1 (2016 version) 
– Compiled for a Raspberrypi 3 and Ubuntu VM
• Busybox 1.30.1 (current stable version)
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FIT - Summary
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Binary - Supervised 
Machine Learning
What Is It? Bin 
(WIIBin)
Annotated Translated DISassembled COde
(ATDISCO)
Stranded Code
20
Un Supervised Machine Learning
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➢K means Cluster
➢ Sequence to Sequence to Sequence –
prototyped
➢Recursive Neural Network (RNN) – type of 
deep learning; natural language 
processing work used for embedding –
prototyped
➢ Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) cells 
and Gated Recursive Units (GRU)
➢Bidirectional Transformer Encoder 
(BERT) – sliding window
➢ Embedding from Language Models 
(ELMo) based on context – Use self 
Attention transformers - prototyped
Theory: unique libraries can be 
identified
Supervised ML:
• Operations fit into Feature Matrix (i.e.12-17 
categories)
• Order of the functions and instructions are 
characterized in an adjacency matrix
Unsupervised ML:
• Token the Operations to represent 
instructions – normalized
• Instructions get embedded into an array for 
Blocks
• Blocks get embedded into an array for 
Functions 
• Triple Sequence Embeddings
Somewhat Un-Supervised ML 
• 50k function pairs for training are feed into 13 epoch with test data of 7.5k pairs
– i.e. BusyBox optimized has over 17K functions
• 4 Training Tasks are interleaved through each Epoch
– Similarity via regression
– Classifier training
– Instruction sequence
– Block Sequence
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Visualization for Unsupervised ML
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Visualization for Unsupervised ML – Cosine Similarity
500 of 44,168 MELTDOWN binary functionsAll 2,200 MELTDOWN library functions
128 functions selected 
from the training set
In these examples darker shades represent closer cosine similarity
Machine Learning for Firmware Analysis
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Trisis/Hatman Visualized –All instructions 
no constraints or no paths
Partial Trisis/Hatman Visualized – No instructions no constraints and no paths
